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I. INTRODUCTION
A. Japanese Developments in Labor Relations Show Many
Faces
Though it has been said the face of a Japanese negotiator can
be "inscrutable," the face or faces of Japanese labor relations in
Japan and the new Japanese-style labor relations in the United
States are more easily described. As new information brings the
subject into closer focus, what historically has been put forward in
sometimes monolithic form as the "traditions" of Japanese labor
relations, has been more recently understood to contain many
"myths" and actually has several "faces." But myth or reality, the
so-called "traditions" of Japanese labor relations are being put
into practice in the United States in adapted form by Japanese
investors and are being adopted by U.S. companies as well. This
Japanese-style labor relations is in effect - the "new labor rela-
tions" in the United States.1
The resulting employment practices and their legality have
significant implications for U.S. labor policies affecting American
workers, unions, and companies as well as the financial viability of
the companies established by the Japanese investor. To under-
stand the impact this "new labor relations" is having in the United
States, some insights into the several faces of Japanese labor rela-
tions as it relates to unionism and treatment of employees may be
useful.
Though some may argue there are "bright" sides and "dark"
sides to the "new labor relations," certainly there are at least pol-
icy issues raised, that should be addressed by those affected, and
perhaps by Congress, as well as by participants in a forum such as
this..
* Professor of Law, University of Hawaii School of Law.
1. See Brown, Labor Law Issues Facing Multinational and Japanese Companies Oper-
ating in the United States Using Japanese-Style Labor Relations: Agenda Items Under
the "New Labor Relations," 8 U. HAW. L. REV. 261 (1986) [hereinafter The New Labor
Relations].
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B. Forces and Effects of Increased Japanese Direct Investment
in the United States
By way of background, it is useful to mention both the forces
and the effects on U.S. interests of increased U.S.-foreign business
dealings. Trade and investment between and within the United
States and foreign businesses, including with Japan, arguably have
had certain effects in the United States:
- politically (pressures for protectionist legislation)
- economically (loss of jobs and industries)
- socially (incidents or allegations of sexism or racism by Japa-
nese companies and also by American companies against Asian-
Americans)
- legally (as our laws are called upon to address, and
sometimes redress these developments)
There are two aspects of foreign business involvement in and
with the United States: foreign trade imports and foreign direct
investment. The balance of trade figures show the United States
has a trade deficit with most of its trading partners, including Ja-
pan, which was a highly visible $60 billion in 1987.2
These trade deficits have also been linked with the loss of jobs
in the United States, as cheaper foreign products displace labor
and industries, such as in the shoe industry in the Northeast.3 Why
does this apparent failure of American competitiveness exist and
who or what is the cause? Blame is variously fixed on high labor
costs, rigid union standards, archaic labor laws, outdated manufac-
turing plants, and outdated management techniques. Of course,
the cause can be attributed to all of the above, plus allegations of
unfair trading practices by the Japanese.
The point is, however, with this high trade deficit, comes cer-
tain political and social realities in the United States. Feelings of
resentment against the Japanese, whether justified or not, are ob-
servable in the United States. Although the issues debated usually
have centered around developing fairer trade relations with Japan
and the appropriateness of invoking the political response of pro-
tectionist legislation, related and somewhat darker manifestations
are also occasionally observable in the form of alleged incidents of
anti-unionism, racism, and sexism allegedly practiced by Japanese
and U.S. companies in the United States against American and
2. See also Powell, Martin, Lewis, Turque & Raine, Where the Jobs Are, NEWSWEEK,





The other facet of American involvement in and with the
United States is foreign direct investment in the United States,
including that from Japan, which is also dramatically increasing at
the same time as the foreign trade deficit.4 Why? One reason is the
surplus of money in Japan as a result of its huge trade surplus. It
is reported that of the ten largest banks in the world, seven are
Japanese.'
Also, perhaps in response to world and United States threats
to erect trade barriers, Japan has been moving much of its consid-
erable foreign direct investment into the United States. In recent
years, nearly one-third of Japan's $10 billion investment in over-
seas manufacturing went to the U.S. and from 1975 the growth of
Japan's direct investment in the United States rose from almost
nothing to an astounding $27 billion in 1986.8 This U.S. manufac-
turing capability provides Japan with direct access to the U.S.
markets without concern for trade barriers and, as is true for other
multinationals, it permits exports from the U.S.-based plants not
only to Japan, but to Europe and world markets that might other-
wise have limitations on these goods if they were shipped from Ja-
pan. Direct investment in the United States is also good public re-
lations in that it assists U.S. efforts to reduce its trade deficit and
creates jobs in the United States.
Other practical reasons causing Japan to invest overseas have
all converged in recent years and prompted its dramatic increase in
foreign direct investment. 7 These include slow domestic demand in
Japan, the changing value of the yen, and competition from coun-
tries with lower labor costs. The Japanese response to these events
has been to try to protect their domestic markets while at the same
time expand their overseas targets, not through direct trade, but
indirectly through direct investment in the United States.
Recent figures show that there are over 500 assembly and
manufacturing plants owned by the Japanese in the United States,
employing some 250,000 American workers.' If reports are accu-
rate, the size of Japan's direct investment in the United States in
4. U.S. Commerce Bureau of Statistics for latest figures.
5. Where the Jobs Are, supra note 2, at 43.
6. Id.
7. Id. at 44. See also Y. Kuwahara, Foreign Investment and Labor-Problems Involved
in Japan's Direct Investment in the United States (Aug. 1985), cited in The New Labor
Relations, supra note 1, at 263.
8. Where the Jobs Are, supra note 2, at 42.
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future years will continue to dramatically increase and the number
of Americans employed by Japanese-owned companies will swell to
840,000 bythe 1990's.1
With these continuing waves of Japanese investment in the
United States comes the Japanese-style labor relations. And if it
continues to work, U.S. companies will also seek to adopt usable
Japanese-style employment practices. What impact this will have
and is having on U.S. workers, unions, and companies, as well as
on the Japanese companies in the United States under existing la-
bor laws, is the subject of my remarks. Whether and how well U.S.
labor laws, largely designed in the 1940's and 1960's, will be able to
adapt and appropriately accommodate the pressures of the "new
labor relations" introduced by the Japanese investors, is a story
that is just beginning.
In this paper, I will touch on two areas: first a discussion of
the Japanese-style employment practices in Japan and the essen-
tial elements being used in the United States; and second, a dis-
cussion of the legal and policy issues they raise under the U.S. la-
bor laws.
II. COMPARATIVE UNITED STATES - JAPAN LABOR RELATIONS
PRACTICES
A. In Japan: Traditions and Myths
1. Background and Traditions
It is interesting to note that in Japan, over the years, there
have been very few minorities and relatively few foreigners living
or working. 0 In such a homogeneous society, it was perhaps ex-
pectable that historic traditions of a Confucian society were easily
carried forward with widespread effect and acceptance throughout
Japanese society. One deeply held principle - the Confucian con-
cept of wa - spiritual ascendance through harmony and common
effort - has by analogy been applied to the working family of a
corporate enterprise."'
9. Id. In 1985, 7.3 percent of Americans employed by foreign firms were employed by a
Japanese owned company. Foreign Direct Investment In the United States, U.S. Depart-
ment of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis 1981-1986.
10. E. REISCHAUER, THE JAPANESE.
11. See Karsh, Managerial Ideology and Workers Co-Optation: The U.S. and Japan,
Viability Of The Japanese Model Of Industrial Relations 81, 87-88 Int'l Indus. Relations
Ass'n 81, 87-88 (1983); see also, Shirai, A Supplement: Characteristics of Japanese Man-
agement and Their Personnel Policies, CONTEMPORARY INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS IN JAPAN 369
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Japanese notions of hierarchical familism and collectivism
based on the amae or family relationship (embodying both pater-
nalism and dependency), place high value on harmony, coopera-
tion, consensus, and loyalty. It is not unexpected then that we see
these concepts utilized in Japanese personnel and labor relations
practices.12
The tradition of collectivism, which takes place within a "fam-
ily" structure, can be observed to be a situation where group effort
is sought over individual accomplishment, harmony is sought over
conflict, and cooperation and consensus are often used as means
to achieve a collective goal. 13 These are reflected in personnel prac-
tices which stereotypically try to "humanize" employment rela-
tions by treating employees as family - as part of the team. In
times of manpower cutback many employees are viewed therefore
as "renewable" rather than "replaceable" assets; and retraining,
rather than discharge would be the preferred course of action.
The two striking features of Japanese labor relations are its
use of cooperation and its management style to achieve its business
goals. The traditional face of the Japanese employer as a paternal-
istic, parent figure in the relationship with its employees, is one
which is taken seriously in its approach to management of the bus-
iness and the workers. And, in return, the employer expects full
effort by the employees in terms of cooperation and loyalty. 4
Cooperation in Japanese labor relations is probably the domi-
nant stereotypical tradition that Westerners notice. It manifests it-
self in a variety of institutionalized employment practices includ-
ing a de-emphasis on management-worker distinctions; and, it is
not uncommon for many levels of supervisors to work side by side
and to socialize outside the workplace. In fact all but the top level
supervisors will usually be represented by the same union.'5 It also
manifests itself in requirements of loyalty, not only in the negative
sense of refraining from disloyal acts or statements, but also in the
affirmative sense of actively engaging in helpful cooperative activi-
ties such as kaizen, where quotas of daily and weekly suggestions
for improvement of company operations must be made.'"
(1983) [hereinafter Shirai].
12. See T. HANAMI, LABOR RELATIONS IN JAPAN TODAY 48-49, 55 (1979).
13. Id.; see also Shirai, supra note 11.
14. See E. VOGEL, JAPAN As NUMBER ONE 146-152 (1979).
15. See Koshiro, Development of Collective Bargaining in
Postwar Japan, CONTEMPORARY INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS IN JAPAN 205 (1983).
16. See, M. IMA, KAIZEN: THE KEY To JAPAN'S COMPETITIVE SUCCESS (1986).
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Job flexibility is a normal requirement when hiring someone
in Japan, rather than giving them a specific and narrow job
description. This permits greater managerial flexibility and avoids
wasteful and duplicative use of labor. This somewhat "holistic" ap-
proach to working for the company provides a vivid contrast to the
traditional U.S. approach on this point where job descriptions have
been viewed as useful in preserving job skills.
Joint consultation through the use of manager-worker com-
mittees provides a forum where cooperation over a wide range of
subjects - including bargainable subjects under U.S. law - will
produce a unified approach to common problems. Often, tradi-
tional managers and workers share decision-making
responsibilities.
Unions often play a dominant part in these cooperative efforts
and their dual role of representing worker interests as well as pro-
moting the common goal of increased productivity would in the
"eyes" of U.S. unions make their independence somewhat suspect.
In fact, the unions in Japan maintain a close working relationship
with the management of their enterprise.17
The principle of cooperation also is seen in the methods by
which Japanese workers resolve industrial disputes. Conflict avoid-
ance mechanisms and the goal of reaching harmony on issues is
said to guide the disagreeing parties toward resolution. It is tradi-
tional in Japan for industrial action to be taken in demonstrative
form without resort to overt conflict; and, harassment or embar-
rassment is used, rather than attempts to damage the "family"
business from which their incomes are derived. Therefore, ribbon
struggles, the use of arm-bands, or as a last resort, strikes of very
short duration might be used to place pressure for settlement.18
Questions are sometimes raised whether the 1-12 ratio of lost work
days due to labor strife in Japan, compared with the United
States, is because Japanese unions are smarter - or weaker.
In addition to cooperation, a second dominant feature of Japa-
nese labor relations is its management style in using its workforce
to achieve business goals. It has been said that the management
philosophies and industrial relations policies of Japanese employ-
ers generally contain five underlying principles:
17. See, Shirai, A Theory of Enterprise Unionism, CONTEMPORARY INDUSTRIAL RELA-
TIONS IN JAPAN 117 (1983).
18. See T. HANAMI, supra note 12, at 113-124; see also W. GOULD, JAPAN'S RESHAPING
OF AMERICAN LABOR LAW 13 (1984).
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First, their primary concern is the continued existence and
further development of their corporation. Second, they regard all
company employees, including themselves, as members of the same
corporate community. Third, they take an egalitarian view of in-
come distribution between labor and management within the com-
pany. Fourth, they are crucially concerned with maintaining stabil-
ity and peace in the company's industrial relations. In other words,
they strive to avoid industrial disputes and strikes, often at any
cost. Fifth, they tend to reject the intervention of outside labor
groups in any negotiations over internal labor problems, an atti-
tude that might be described as exclusionist. 9
These principles pervade the Japanese personnel management
system, and although there are many similarities with the Ameri-
can system, one of the most apropos of the many comparisons
made of American and Japanese management approaches is that
"Japanese and American management is 95 percent the same and
differs in all important respects." 0
Lastly, using group consensus as a management style in deci-
sion-making is said to have the advantage of putting the full group
behind their decision (even though some argue this requires too
much time before decisions and also cynically note these discus-
sions are often orchestrated by higher management).21 This con-
trasts, however, with a traditional U.S. management-style where a
"command from management" may require much time after the
decisions in order for the group to implement "management's"
decision.
2. The Three Pillars of Japanese Industrial Relations: Realities
and Myths
The Japanese have incorporated the traditional attributes of
their personnel management relations, such as a cooperation and
working for the common good of the enterprise, into their more
recent industrial relations policies. These policies, the so-called
"three-pillars" of Japanese industrial relations, are lifetime or per-
manent employment (shushin koyo), wage-seniority policies
(nenko), and enterprise unionism.22
Loyalty and cooperation are encouraged by the first two poli-
19. Shirai, supra note 11, at 374-375.
20. R. PASCALE & A. ATHOS, THE ART OF JAPANESE MANAGEMENT 85 (1981).
21. This is described in Rohlen, The Contemporary Work Group, MODERN JAPANESE
ORGANIZATION AND DECISION-MAKING 185, 191-195 (1975).
22. See T. HANAMI, supra note 12, at 88-112.
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cies because of the job security provided by the policy of perma-
nent employment and by the assurance given to the more senior
workers under the wage-seniority policy that even though their
wages will be lower initially, the less senior workers generally will
not pass them in wages or rank.2 3 This protection of a worker's
"status" is further supported by a common, related policy of "pro-
moting from within" the company, rather than through a lateral
hiring. Over the years there has been low employee mobility as em-
ployers seemed reluctant to hire mobile employees, especially at a
lateral level, perhaps because their loyalty is suspect.
The third pillar, enterprise unionism, is a system where em-
ployees are organized on a plant-wide basis, rather than on an in-
dustrial or craft basis.2' Also, Japanese unions, while having verti-
cal affiliations, differ from those in the U.S. in that the relationship
does not usually provide "international union muscle" at the local
enterprise level, but rather performs other functions. The local en-
terprise union has autonomy over its decisions and rules. Inasmuch
as the enterprise union in Japan has the dual function of protect-
ing workers and productivity, it finds itself in a position to be quite
responsive to the local needs of the plant.
The face of labor relations portrayed by Japanese employers'
use of these three pillars is marred, however, by the fact that these
practices are minority practices riddled with exceptions. In fact,
lifetime employment is provided to fewer than twenty-five percent
of Japanese workers; pure wage-seniority is available to less than
one percent; and enterprise unionism is normally present only in
the larger companies.25
In fact, studies show Japanese employees work long work
weeks, are noted for not taking their vacation time, and the Japa-
nese employers have a history of under-employing women and mi-
norities, and making great use of temporary workers - the so-
called shock absorbers for business fluctuations - who do not
qualify for the same benefits as permanent employees.2"
Critics of the Japanese system of labor relations contend that
in addition to the statistical absence of the three pillars of indus-
23. See Koike, Internal Labor Markets: Workers in Large Firms, in Shirai, supra note
11, at 30-60.
24. See A Theory of Enterprise Unionism, in Shirai, supra note 17 at, 205-257.
25. See, e.g., Modic, Myths About Japanese Management, INDUSTRY WEEK, Oct. 5,
1987, at 49-53; see also W. GOULD, supra note 18, at 104; R. COLE, JAPANESE BLUE COLLAR:
THE CHOOSING TRADITION 81-82 (1971); T. HANAMI, supra note 12, at 31-35.
26. See T. HANAMI, supra note 12, at 26.
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trial relations in Japan, there are other defects. For example, life-
time employment may keep incompetent but loyal employees on
the payroll, but if they are not producing, this cuts into efficiency.
The policy of wage-seniority is a method of deferred compensation
that permits an employer to employ young workers very inexpen-
sively and arguably inhibits their mobility as every year goes by.
The third pillar, enterprise unionism, is viewed by some as too
weak a protection for workers. They argue that the union's loyalty
is divided loyalty and their lack of effective affiliation at either a
horizontal or vertical level renders the union too responsive to the
needs of the employer at the expense of the workers.
Recent commentary about Japan suggests that work is long
and hard in Japan, that labor mobility is on the rise, and that un-
derneath the veneer of cooperation is a strenuous competition.
This is a face of Japanese labor relations seen by some."
3. Exporting the Recurring Themes
What is the proper face of Japanese labor relations? Like most
societies it has many faces and raises the universal truth in com-
parative labor relations, that one must be quite cautious in too-
easily transplanting doctrines from one society to another.
However, there are, of course, many positive aspects of Japa-
nese labor relations that are being brought to the United States by
Japanese companies investing and setting up operations in the
United States. Also, some of the Japanese-style approaches are be-
ing adopted and adapted by U.S. companies. There are several re-
curring industrial relations themes that find increased use in the
United States. These include joint employer-employee consultation
committees, increased use of flexible job descriptions, and at-
tempts at cooperation rather than conflict to resolve disputes.28
Perhaps most importantly, what the Japanese companies
bring with them are their attitudes and expectations regarding per-
sonnel and management practices which are based on their own
experiences. These can be reflected in management decisions or
personnel practices relating to unionism, employment discrimina-
tion and dismissals, even though "American managers are running
27. See Modic, supra note 25.
28. See, e.g., Witnesses Tout Benefits of Cooperation Before Presidential Committee
on Mediation, 182 D.L.R. (BNA), A-8 - A-11 (Sept. 19, 1986); see also Note, The G.M.-
Toyota Joint Venture: Legal Cooperation or Illegal Combination in the World Automobile
Industry? 19 TEX. INT'L L.J. 699 (1984).
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the company." This potential for bringing Japanese labor relations
practices or attitudes to the United States is enhanced by the com-
mon use of "rotating staff" whereby Japanese executives and man-
agers rotate from the parent company in Japan to the United
States for a two or three-year overseas tour of duty.
B. U.S. Adaptations: Quest to Utilize Essential Elements of
Japanese Practices
Japanese are very pragmatic investors in that they usually
seek to adapt to their host countries' laws and culture to the extent
possible, that will still permit successful operation of their com-
pany. Though they may continue to prefer "sushi" they will par-
ticipate in backyard barbecues; likewise though they may prefer
not to have unions, if unions are lawfully established, they will deal
with them.2 However, some of their practices such as cooperation
with employees and unions raise legal questions under U.S. law.
The Japanese have come to embrace certain American cus-
toms such as dismissing employees (though not as readily as U.S.
employers); however, they have not yet adjusted to the large jury
verdicts in wrongful discharge cases in the United States.
Normally, Japanese companies do not explicitly discriminate
against U.S. workers on the basis of race or sex, but rather some of
their policies - which are deemed essential to the successful oper-
ation of their U.S. subsidiary - have the effect of excluding per-
sons in apparent violation of U.S. law.
American companies seeking to find methods of improving op-
erations have looked to the success of Japanese management and
labor relations styles and have sought to implement them. For ex-
ample, the G.M.-Toyota joint venture in California, and the G.M.
Saturn project as well as numerous projects in the steel and manu-
facturing industries have taken great strides in devising manage-
ment and labor relations approaches and contract provisions which
seek to replace confrontation with cooperation." Here too, legal is-
sues are arising as to the extent employers, employees, and unions
may cooperate under U.S. labor laws before a violation occurs. All
these issues will be discussed below more fully.
29. It is estimated that about 25 percent of Japanese owned companies in the United
States are unionized. See Where the Jobs Are, supra note 2, at 44.
30. A copy of the agreement is reprinted in 107 D.L.R. (BNA) E-1, E-6 (June 4, 1986).
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C. Policy Issues Emerging From Legal Agenda
As legal issues arise regarding the introduction of Japanese-
style labor relations into the United States and the courts begin
the process of applying U.S. labor laws, there is also being gener-
ated from the legal agenda, larger policy issues as to how these new
labor relations practices are affecting or may affect U.S. labor poli-
cies relating to traditional U.S. approaches to unionism, civil
rights, and the institutionalized use of confrontation or confronta-
tional-based cooperation to resolve employer-employee differences.
Some of these issues are outlined below.
On the issue of what level of cooperation should be permitted
between labor and management, several related policy questions
arise:
Does the U.S. ability to compete effectively in the interna-
tional market require changes in U.S. labor policies, permitting
greater cooperation? For example, is the National Labor Relations
Act violated when employees with quasi-supervisory or managerial
responsibilities work with other employees in a shared responsibil-
ity situation; or when a group of employees is dealt with by the
employer on a broad range of economic and management subjects
under a joint consultation arrangement; or in the spirit of coopera-
tion, recognition is given to a union at a new facility before it is
opened; or the employer provides training and instructional trips
to union officials to learn more about the business? There is case
law developing on each of these issues.
Related subsidiary questions include:
a. Can and should American traditions of mandatory roles of
confrontation and arms-length dealing be adjusted within the pre-
sent legal framework of U.S. labor laws to permit increased cooper-
ation without violating the laws or are legislative changes
required?
b. Is it desirable to permit too close a relationship; is there not
a danger that too much union cooperation with the employer can
co-opt the union and remove the union as a protective representa-
tive of the workers and perhaps at least compromise the union's
legal duty of fair representation?
c. Will shared authority between the employers and unions
improve worker productivity and increase international
competitiveness?
d. Related non-policy practical questions include, whether un-
ions' internal leadership and employers' management leadership
can adjust so as to implement changes permitting increased
1989]
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cooperation?
On these policy issues, Steven Schlossberg, Deputy Undersec-
retary of Labor, who has coordinated a national study exploring
ways to improve cooperation, predicts:
For the last 50 years, the law has assumed that labor and man-
agement are adversarial opponents and must have an arms-length
relationship. If we're going to be competitive in the global econ-
omy, we may have to blur distinctions between labor and
management.3'
A second set of policy issues arise in the area of civil rights
legislation affecting labor:
Is present direct investment by foreign companies accompa-
nied by increased incidents of racism or sexism; by foreign compa-
nies against American citizens; by American companies against
Asian-American citizens?
Related subsidiary questions include:
a. Are U.S. labor laws (e.g., Title Seven of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964 and the Civil Rights Act of 1866 (Sec. 1981)) adequate to
address any resulting discrimination?
b. Should U.S. labor laws accommodate discriminatory foreign
labor practices rooted in traditions argued to be necessary to the
successful operation of the business?
On this last point, the U.S. Supreme Court did not yet decide
the issue, but has noted that it may be that U.S. labor laws could
be interpreted so as to accommodate foreign labor policies. In dic-
tum it stated:
There can be little doubt that some positions in a Japanese
controlled company doing business in the United States call for
great familiarity with not only the language of Japan, but also the
culture, customs and business practices of that country.2
The policy question is where the proper balance should be be-
tween American social values prohibiting discrimination and the
interests of foreign enterprises to maintain adequate control over
their choice of personnel permitted under U.S. labor laws. To per-
mit discretion perhaps assists foreign direct investment in the
United States but alternatively, it can undermine national labor
policies against discrimination.
31. Quoted in Hoerr, America's Labor Laws Weren't Written For A Global Economy,
Bus. WK., Jan. 13, 1986, at 38.
32. Sumitomo Shoji America Inc. v. Avagliano, 457 U.S. 176, 189 n.19 (1982).
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III. LEGAL ISSUES UNDER U.S. LABOR LAWS
A. Applicability of FCN Treaty
In 1982 in Sumitomo Shoji America. Inc. v. Avagliano,33 the
U.S. Supreme Court held that a Japanese subsidiary incorporated
in the United States was subject to U.S. labor laws and the treaty
defense that permits foreign companies the right to employ execu-
tive personnel "of their choice" thus was not available. The deci-
sion did not apply to branches of foreign companies or foreign
companies operating in the United States and the court rejected
the notion that its use of the "place of incorporation" test would
create a "crazy-guilt pattern" which would give the rights of
branches of Japanese companies operating in the United States
greatly superior rights over those locally incorporated. The only
advantage is the limited right to choose Japanese nationals for cer-
tain executive managerial positions.
This "right to choose managers," available to foreign compa-
nies and foreign branches, was recently upheld in MacNamara v.
Korean Air Lines,34 where the federal district court found the
FCN treaty immunized the employer from U.S. labor laws when it
replaced an American sales manager with a younger Korean em-
ployee. Interestingly, it provided a somewhat broad definition of
"executive personnel" to include those foreigners approved by U.S.
Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) for treaty trader
visas.
Though other recent cases have applied U.S. labor laws, such
as the NLRA, to foreign companies, this should not be confused
with exempting narrow categories of executive personnel from its
application, if the issue had arisen in those cases which it did not.
For example, the Seventh Circuit recently found the State Bank of
India subject to the NLRA in upholding NLRB findings of unfair
labor practices against "employees. 3 5 Thus, the definition of "em-
ployee" versus "executive personnel" will be important, as one cat-
egory of the employer's workforce may be covered under the labor
law and the other excluded, and this may vary under different la-
bor laws. It is clear that a future issue under cases involving for-
eign companies will be to determine the definition of "executive"
under the FCN treaty. A troubling aspect of the recent KAL case
33. Id.
34. MacNamara v. Korean Air Lines, Lab. Rel. Rep. (BNA) (45 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas.)
384 (Nov. 9, 1987).
35. State Bank of India v. N.L.R.B., 808 F.2d 526 (1986).
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was the potential for the court to rely too heavily on statutory defi-
nitions of various labor laws in reaching its interpretation under
the FCN treaty rather than first determining the executive status
of the person in question before ever considering the labor law
definitions.
Once determining that an FCN defense is available, it is im-
portant to note that while the exclusion is broad, the reach of that
exemption is narrowly limited to the "executive personnel."
In the KAL case, the court stated:
It does not matter that plaintiff's employment discrimination
claim is based upon age, race and national origin, and not upon
citizenship. The FCN Treaty gives protection to the Korean corpo-
ration to make its employment decision in limited areas without
regard to domestic employment laws. . .[t]o allow plaintiff to pro-
ceed would negate the "of their choice" FCN Treaty language and
require the treaty party to justify on a business necessity basis the
action taken undermining the treaty commitment to permit treaty
parties to control and manage the business enterprise in the host
country."'
One of the common practices of Japanese companies investing
in the United States is the use of rotating staff who come from the
parent company and serve as managers in the overseas assignment
for a number of years before they are rotated to another location.
Such "executive personnel" are exempted by the FCN treaty from
U.S. labor laws only if they are working for a "foreign company;"
whereas, if they are working for a foreign company which is incor-
porated in the United States, then under Sumitomo, they are not
exempt and they are covered by U.S. labor laws.
Some legal issues arise as to who is the "employer" of the ro-
tating staff in such situations; and, if there are joint employers
under U.S. law, what is the potential liability, if any, of the Japa-
nese parent corporation? On a related issue, because of the Japa-
nese-style of management, there may be a close, "parent-child" re-
lationship between parent and subsidiary that could bring issues of
the legal liability of the parent to the forefront, by the parent com-
pany taking active involvement in coordinating the labor and man-
agement policies of its subsidiary. These are interesting questions
and are of growing concern to international corporation lawyers.
36. Korean Air Lines, 45 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. at 390.
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B. National Labor Relations Act
Under the National Labor Relations Act, the Japanese- style
new labor relations, embodying increased cooperation between la-
bor and management, raises legal issues both as to the permissible
extent of cooperation and the changing responsibilities and liabili-
ties of the unions under their duty of fair representation. Japa-
nese-style cooperation utilizes joint participation in decision-mak-
ing, open sharing of information, and increased joint
responsibilities over managerial operations. The relationship often
is viewed as part of a common enterprise with the "team" all work-
ing together to achieve the mutual goal of increasing productivity,
and with it, market shares and profitability. Implementing this re-
lationship in the United States has raised several specific legal is-
sues which tests the elasticity of U.S. labor laws.
The use of quality circles, joint consultation committees, and
"work teams" which perform some supervisory/managerial func-
tions raise issues under U.S. labor laws, whether workers involved
in these cooperative undertakings are "managerial or supervisory"
and thus are excluded from the protection of the N.L.R.A.; and/or
whether their involvement so taints the arms-length requirement
of the U.S. labor-management relationship that it interferes with
the employees' right to have their labor organization representative
independent of undue employer influence. Does U.S. labor law per-
mit this cooperation or does it require arms-length negotiation
through confrontation? The answer has significant ramifications
not only for Japanese companies in the U.S. but also the new labor
relations arrangements made under Saturn, NUMMI, Pontiac
Fiero, and other American ventures.
One of the leading U.S. Supreme Court cases on this issue is
N.L.R.B. v. Yeshiva,37 where the court found faculty members at a
private university'participated so directly and effectively in mana-
gerial decisions that they lost their "employee" status, and their
protection under the NLRA. Though later cases distinguish
Yeshiva, often on their facts and the extent of real control and
influence, the legal dilemma is raised whether employee groups
and joint consultation committees can be given so much authority
in management decisions and over operations that their influence
could be characterized as "meaningful." It would seem that to give
employees meaningful input may at the same time make them part
37. N.L.R.B. v. Yeshiva University, 444 U.S. 672 (1980).
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of the "management team" and strip them of their protections
under the labor law. To provide employees with less than meaning-
ful influence risks making a mockery of the entire cooperation
mechanism in question.
A 1987 case decided by the NLRB, Anamag,38 addressed this
issue where the employer was utilizing the Japanese "team con-
cept" of managerial philosophy. In that case, the employer estab-
lished, for the stated purpose of promoting "employee participa-
tion in decision making and to foster open communication between
management and employee," a number of teams each led by a
"team leader." The team had some authority over personnel mat-
ters such as discipline, performance evaluations, job assignments,
overtime, and grievances.
The narrow legal issue before the Board was whether the team
leader had been given sufficient authority over work assignments,
discipline, and benefits to render him a "supervisor" under the
Act. The Board found that although the "teams" performed some
supervisory functions, the team leader, in this case, was deter-
mined not to be a supervisor. The Board found it important that
the team leader was elected by the team and served solely at the
will of the team. Also the team leader functioned primarily as a
spokesperson for the team rather than on behalf of management
and any nominal authority possessed by the leader was possessed
only by the continuing tacit agreement of the team.
The Board in approving this arrangement seems to suggest
that if "employee teams" are performing management functions
and as a group retain the right to remove themselves or their team
leader from that role, the law will seek to accommodate that de-
sire. The Board in declining to exclude the team leader from the
bargaining unit, noted that the "novel and rather complex concep-
tual framework within which team leaders perform their func-
tions" was a "framework which surely was not contemplated by the
drafters of the Act over 50 years ago.''" Thus, the Japanese style
use of worker teams with "non-supervisory" team leaders may in
some forms be accomplished under existing U.S. labor laws. The
significant factor in the Anamag case seemed to have been the re-
tained right of employees to withdraw cooperation and to confront
if necessary.
However, it is difficult to generalize on these issues due to the




myriad of variables in such personnel arrangements and the result-
ing legal issues. For example, if actual managerial or supervisory
personnel are closely working with the teams, perhaps in a com-
monly used joint consultation relationship, this could change the
decision and render the cooperation unlawful as interfering with
employees' free choice or dominating a "labor organization." Case
law on these types of issues are arising; and, although traditional
case law might find particular labor-management joint consulta-
tion committees to be a "labor organization," some courts are hold-
ing these groups should not be set aside as unlawfully dominated
absent a finding of "actual" rather than "potential" domination.
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals on this point noted:
[flor us to condemn this organization would mark approval of
a purely adversarial model of labor relations. Where a cooperative
arrangement reflects a choice freely arrived at and where the or-
ganization is capable of being a meaningful avenue for the expres-
sion of employee wishes, we find it unobjectionable under the
Act."'
What these joint cooperative committees discuss can also raise
legal issues in a collective bargaining relationship if the committee
is not also the union. Japanese employers are used to open commu-
nication on many issues - mandatory and non-mandatory - and
under Japanese labor law they are obligated to discuss these mat-
ters with all unions, majority and minority. Thus, if Japanese em-
ployees follow that practice in the United States, issues can arise
about who the employer is "dealing" with and about what.
Another recent legal development arising out of the relation-
ship of cooperation, is the pre-recognition issue of the General
Motors, Saturn Corp. case.'1 In this case, the employer and union
under an existing relationship, in contemplation of the opening of
a new business operation entered into an understanding that the
union would represent the workers at the new facility. The move
was challenged as a premature recognition and as unfairly interfer-
ing with the new employees' right to choose their own union repre-
sentative and as unfairly assisting the recognized labor union. The
Board, after considerable deliberation, found that the agreement
reached by G.M. and the U.A.W. did not violate the Act in that
40. Hertzka & Knowles v. N.L.R.B., 503 F.2d 625, 631 (9th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 423
U.S. 875 (1975) (emphasis added).
41. 13 Advice Mem. Rptr. Para. 23,090 (1986); see also 107 D.L.R. (BNA) A-4 (June 4,
1986).
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recognition was to be given only if the union established majority
status at the new plant.
The attempt to cooperate by pre-recognition agreements,
while in some situations, not an improper subject to discuss, must
be approached cautiously in that U.S. labor law is clearly settled in
favor of first requiring majority consent to a bargaining
representative.
Other issues that may arise from Japanese companies using
Japanese-style labor relations in the companies' treatment of the
unions and union officials. In Japan, close working relationships
with union officials may include payments to them for a number of
labor relations related activities. In the United States, such assis-
tance is limited by the labor laws and thus a number of practices
in the United States such as flying union officials to Japan to study
Japanese labor relations, as well as other concerns, must be ex-
amined carefully.
The final issue is perplexing to American unions; how do the
unions respond to the movement into the new cooperative labor
relations? In addition to the internal political realities facing union
leadership, and the concerns of being undercut and rendered impo-
tent by this new approach, legal issues can also arise from the un-
ions' changing role, as regards its duty of fair representation.
While cooperation is certainly not a new word to American un-
ions, their embrace of the new challenges of joint consultation,
company teams, etc., has been deliberative. To move from a role
primarily protective of workers' interests into one which also par-
ticipates in work strategies to increase productivity, of course
raises many issues for union leaders, many of which are non-legal,
policy issues. To the extent meaningful decisions are made which
are perceived detrimental to the workers' interests, members can
raise the issue of unfair representation by their union. At least in
this respect, the employer shares the union's desire to fairly re-
present the employees, as that provides the employer a defense in
Section 301 breach of contract suits. Therefore, as always, it is in
the interest of employers, unions, and employees to find that right
balance of cooperation which is permitted under the labor laws
and meets the needs of the parties as best as can be
accommodated.
C. Employment Discrimination
Japanese employers in the United States are experiencing
some legal problems with employment discrimination claims, per-
[Vol. 15:231
Japanese Labor Relations
haps arising from their adherence to industrial relations practices
brought from Japan. These practices often require great selectivity
in hiring, treatment of individual employees as members of groups
within the company for benefits and incentives, and retention of
the "home office rotating staff of managerial employees system"
and employment practices arising from its use.
Japanese employers in Japan and in the United States always
are very selective in their hiring practices. This, it is felt, will mini-
mize later personnel problems and work toward the goal of having
a "harmonious family operation." Attitude, as well as skill, is seen
as a useful ingredient in this "recipe" for success since loyalty,
ability to work in a group, and accepting flexible job assignments is
part of the Japanese managerial philosophy. Reports indicate that
Nissan Motor Company in Tennessee hired 2,000 employees from
a pool of 130,000 applicants after rounds of tests and interviews. "2
With the use of high selectivity and subjective factors such as
attitude, lawsuits under U.S. employment discrimination laws can
be anticipated and there have been a number of cases in the
United States in recent years against Japanese companies includ-
ing Sumitomo, Honda, Toshiba, Hoya, Cannon, and NEC Elec-
tronics."3 There is no indication of an abnormally high number of
cases involving foreign companies, but likely because of the real
and perceived effects of the U.S. trade deficit and increased direct
investment in the United States, such cases are widely reported.
One such case involved Honda Manufacturing Co., Inc. which
recently agreed to a $6 million out-of-court settlement with the
E.E.O.C. on race and sex discrimination charges where 370 blacks
and females were awarded back pay and seniority for having been
denied jobs at Honda." This followed a prior E.E.O.C.-Honda set-
tlement last year for nearly $500,000 involving age discrimination
charges.
Foreign companies traditionally send a nucleus of key person-
nel to the United States to establish and maintain operations.
These often consist of the rotating staff of executives and manage-
rial employees who typically enter the United States under a
treaty trader visa, as discussed earlier. These rotating staff person-
nel are usually male Japanese nationals. The percentage of home
country staff varies with the type of operation. For example, in the
42. Junkerman, Nissan, Tennessee, THE PROGRESSIVE 16, 17 (June 1987).
43. Id.
44. See 58 D.L.R. (BNA) A-9 (Mar. 25, 1988).
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late 1970's Sumitomo Shoji America, Inc. employed about 432 peo-
ple nationwide and over 200 people in its New York offices.'9
About 40-45 percent of the New York employees were rotating
staff. By contrast, Nissan Motor Co. in Tennessee had 13 Japanese
executives at a facility which employs 3,300. These positions held
by the foreign executives, however, are extremely influential.
In 1982, the U.S. Supreme Court in Sumitomo Shoji America,
Inc., 6 held that Japanese companies incorporated in the United
States are subject to U.S. labor laws. In that employment discrimi-
nation case, no application of U.S. labor laws was made, but the
case was remanded. In dictum, though no decision was made, it
was stated that Title Seven of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 may or
may not accommodate Japanese labor and managerial employment
practices. Some five years later, a settlement in this case was an-
nounced where the employer agreed to allocate nearly $3 million
over three years to train, promote, and pay its female workers in
the United States.47 The settlement agreement also requires that
women be placed in 23-25 percent of the management and sales
positions. The company attorney is quoted as saying there is no
admission of liability and the agreement reflects a decision to
"Americanize" its U.S. offices as part of a "world-wide localiza-
tion" of its subsidiaries."
Whether this "Americanization" process will be picked up by
other Japanese companies and will involve integration of rotating
staffs remains to be seen. It is predictable, however, that the law-
suits will continue.
Employment practices by Japanese companies which may give
rise to legal issues often emanate from the rotating staff policy and
distinctions made between foreign nationals and U.S. citizens
working for the same company. For example, besides the obvious
hiring and promotion problems of such a policy where the staff is
usually all male Japanese nationals, other issues involve disparate
benefits paid or provided to them in terms of salaries, incentives,
travel, training, and layoff protection.
One case involving Shiseido Cosmetics America, Ltd.,'49 in-
45. Avagliano v. Sumitomo Shoji America, Inc., 103 F.R.D. 562, 568-569 n. 7 (S.D. N.Y.
1984). (For Nissan statistics, see Where The Jobs Are, supra note 2.
46. Sumitomo, 457 U.S. at 176 (1982).
47. See 10 D.L.R. (BNA) A-7, A-8 (Jan. 15, 1987).
48. Id. at A-8.
49. Shiseido Cosmetics (America) Ltd. v. State Human Rights Appeal Board, 72 A.D.2d
711, 421 N.Y.S.2d 589 (1979).
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volved a dismissal of a U.S. citizen, a female, under a retrenchment
policy that left the Japanese rotating staff in tact. The New York
court held there was no evidence of national origin discrimination
and noted "the Japanese were in reality employees of the parent
corporation" assigned under a rotation program, thus showing a le-
gitimate business reason. It is doubtful that this 1979 lower court
case provides a very substantial precedent where evidence is shown
of racial or sexual discrimination or even where evidence is shown
of disparate impact, absent a proper legal defense.
The primary laws prohibiting employment discrimination are
Title Seven of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the 1866 Civil
Rights Act (Section 1981).50 Title Seven prohibits discrimination
based on race, color, religion, sex, or national origin and Section
1981 prohibits discrimination based on race.
The potential violation by a Japanese company is the same as
exists for U.S. companies, but the employment of Japanese male
nationals in the rotating staff adds an additional level of potential
liability based on race, sex, and national origin. Under Title Seven,
discrimination based on citizenship has been equated in pertinent
cases with national origin and held by the U.S. Supreme Court to
be excluded from coverage under the Act (unless it can be shown
to be pretextual)5 1 On the other hand, the U.S. Supreme Court in
1987 in Saint Francis College v. Al-Khazraji52 and Shaare Tefila
Congregation v. Cobb 5 held that under the 1866 Civil Rights Act,
"race" may embody concepts of national origin and ethnicity (and
perhaps therefore, albeit indirectly, citizenship) so that discrimina-
tion on that basis is unlawful. Furthermore, the 1866 Civil Rights
Act provides for punitive damages.
Under U.S. law, even where violations may be shown certain
defenses may immunize the discriminating employer. For example,
under Title Seven an employer who can show its discrimination
was based on "business necessity" or a "bona fide occupational
qualification" may be excused. The Supreme Court in Sumitomo
did not rule on these defenses, but observed:
There can be little doubt that some positions in a Japanese
controlled company doing business in the United States call for
great familiarity with not only the language of Japan, but also the
50. Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §2000e-2(a)(1982); Civil Rights Act of 1866, 42
U.S.C. §1981 (1982).
51. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
52. Saint Francis College v. A] Khazraji, 107 S. Ct. 2022 (1987)Y
53. Shaare Tefila Congregation v. Cobb, 107 S. Ct. 2019 (1987).
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culture, customs and business practices of that country."
Whether that will be interpreted by the courts to permit the
statutory defenses remains to be seen. There are many obstacles to
that conclusion as important questions of fact and policy are
raised; such as - cannot an American who speaks Japanese be
hired; and, should foreign companies' employment practices be
used to justify discriminatory policies which otherwise violate U.S.
labor laws? The cases providing these interpretations should be oc-
curring in the immediate future, unless, as Sumitomo's attorney
stated, programs by the Japanese companies to "Americanize" its
operations remove the issue, by a change in the employment prac-
tice of utilizing only Japanese males in their rotating staff. Ironi-
cally, this practice is not peculiar to Japan or to Japanese labor
relations, as many foreign companies, including those from the
United States, utilize rotating staffs.
Lastly, some mention should be made of the developing case
law involving employment discrimination by American companies
against Asian-Americans. The significance of this might lie in the
ironic development that a body of case law is building in response
to discrimination (perhaps precipitated by the successes of foreign
companies in trade and investment) against Asian-Americans that
will provide useful law for U.S. plaintiffs to combat alleged dis-
crimination by foreign companies.
This "reverse discrimination" claim against foreign employers
would be based on developing case law where the American em-
ployer is found to violate the law. For example, cases under Title
Seven have held unlawful discrimination exists where unequal pay
is given based on national origin; where tenure is denied based on
ancestry; 56 and, under Section 1981, where employment decisions
are based on being a Chinese-American or a Korean-American
(Oriental).56 In 1987 the Supreme Court found Italian-Americans
were a cognizable racial group under Section 1981. 57 Inasmuch as
the Supreme Court has also held that both Title Seven and Sec-
tion 1981 provide a remedy for caucasians discriminated against
because of race,58 a substantial body of legal precedent presently
exists to provide a remedy for proven discrimination by a foreign
54. Sumitomo, 457 U.S. at 189 n.19 (1982).
55. See, e.g., Woo v. Board of Regents of California, (BNA) (32 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas.)
349 (1983).
56. See, e.g., Kim v. Commandant Language Institute, 772 F.2d 521 (1985).
57. Chirino v. Jordan Marsh Co., 107 S. Ct. 2476 (1987).
58. See McDonald v. Sante Fe Trail Transportation Co., 427 U.S. 273 (1976).
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employer, based on the applicant or employee's ancestry or ethnic
characteristics, though it is more difficult when based merely on
citizenship.
Though Section 1981 (unlike Title Seven) does not prohibit
sex discrimination, court interpretations provide for punitive dam-
ages, available to all whose claims of discrimination can be charac-
terized as based on ancestry or ethnic characteristics not based
solely on national origin. 9
D. Wrongful Discharge
Japanese employers in Japan stereotypically do not dismiss
employees except for severe misfeasance. While this tends to be
true in the minority percentage of the workforce where lifetime
employment is still used, many Japanese workers, especially the
temporary workers, know that severance of employment is not un-
expected nor uncommon. However, under Japanese law, where dis-
missal occurs, remedies may be available where proper notice is
not given or sometimes if there is inadequate cause; and although
Japanese traditionally loathe resorting to litigation, an increasing
number are seeking remedies, which is often dealt with by media-
tion or conciliation.
The difference between Japan and the United States, however,
lies in the remedy. In Japan, an apology still goes a long way to-
ward restoring an injured plaintiff, and when compensation is
awarded it is traditionally very modest by U.S. standards. There-
fore, when a U.S. based Japanese employer is forced to dismiss an
employee, as is the American style, it is usually quite surprised by
reports that plaintiffs in wrongful discharge cases in some states
prevail nearly three-fourths of the time and often recover in excess
of $400,000.0
The number of discharges of employees in the United States
by Japanese companies is certainly not widespread, and is likely
fewer than that of U.S. employers, because of very selective hiring
procedures. However, there are areas of vulnerability for Japanese
managers, as where they might react against a "disloyal" employee
by considering discharge. Disloyalty of course can be based on
many factors, but it also can occur when an employee will not vio-
59. See Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 454 (1975).
60. See Labor and Employment Law Section, State Bar of Cal., To Strike a New Bal-
ance, LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAw NEWS 5 (Feb. 8, 1984), cited in, 8 UNIv. HAW. L. REV. 330
n.361.
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late public policy for the employer or when the employee "blows
the whistle" on its employer's wrongdoing. Both cases are classic
examples of wrongful discharge under U.S. law, where similar cases
have provided remedies of millions of dollars. These problems are
sometimes aggravated by the tendency of Japanese clients to seek
their lawyer's advice after the problem, rather than seeking pre-
ventative advice.
For the most part, however, it has been my experience that
Japanese clients want to obey the U.S. labor laws and be good citi-
zens. On the other hand, they do not want to be placed on a com-
petitive disadvantage with American competitors, and as they seek
profit and market shares, they seek to keep their basic labor and
management styles that work so well.
IV. CONCLUSION
All indications are that Japanese and other foreign investment
in the United States will continue at an accelerated pace, and in-
creasing numbers of Americans will be working for Japanese-
owned companies. Because Japanese management brings with it
the familiar faces of Japanese traditions of management and in-
dustrial relations approaches and because American companies will
continue to adopt the Japanese style of labor relations, it is pru-
dent to conclude the legal issues just described will continue before
the U.S. courts.
Policy and legal questions involving the U.S. labor laws need
to be addressed by those who are interested. And, perhaps the
United States will find itself continuing to move on the course
from confrontation toward cooperation, in both attitudes and in
employment practices.
However, I would submit that before we completely embrace
total cooperation and joint decision-making between labor and
management based on the Japanese experience and change our
laws to accommodate the new labor relations, that we pause to
carefully examine the effects:
- on the protection of workers, in terms of health, economics,
and quality of worklife;
- on the structures, strength, and liabilities of American
unions;
- on productivity; and
- the advantages and disadvantages on the management of
U.S. businesses.
One face of Japanese labor relations with its shiny efficiency,
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enterprise unionism, cooperation, and productivity should be
placed in proper context with another face of Japanese labor rela-
tions which yet seeks to achieve a forty hour work week and a work
atmosphere where workers actually take their vacation time. Is
America ready for this?
Perhaps Sumitomo's lawyer was correct in predicting the
"Americanization" of Japanese companies in the United States will
sweep away many of the legal issues under U.S. labor laws; but
until that time, it seems only prudent to continue with the ap-
proach used by the NLRB and the courts of encouraging voluntary
and innovative uses of cooperative mechanisms in the work place
while at the same time protecting the rights of the participants,
labor and management, to step back if necessary to protect their
legitimate interests through confrontational or other means of self-
help.
Perhaps this interim approach, a type of conditional coopera-
tion, or - "cooperative confrontation" - with emphasis on the
former, can spawn a trust and respect that will provide a basis for
development of appropriate national policy approaches to the U.S.
labor laws which will meet the needs of international and domestic
competition.
In the meantime, on the practical operational level, coopera-
tion and techniques of mutual benefit should be encouraged and
the law should be scrutinized to avoid legal preclusion of such ex-
perimentation. Flexibility, under the law, should continue to per-
mit the structuring of wedded interests so that if desired an enter-
prise, composed of management and workers, can operate
increasingly as an integrated, productive organism where mutual
self-interest propels it into competitive excellence. The challenge
then is to draw upon the results of this experimentation a new na-
tional labor policy which works most effectively to promote the in-
terests of competitiveness while at the same time protecting the
rights of workers and unions.
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